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A.

Standards, Standardization and Patents

Technical standards like Wi-Fi, 3G/4G/5G, Bluetooth and USB enable devices made by
different manufacturers – whether laptops, smartphones, automobiles or heart monitors – to
communicate with very little effort by the end user. Today, these standards impact virtually all
aspects of the modern networked economy. The existence of these standards, and the widespread
product interoperability that they enable, give rise to significant market efficiencies known as
“network effects.” Such standards can increase innovation, efficiency, and consumer choice;
reduce barriers to market entry; foster public health and safety; and enable efficient and reliable
international trade. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, “[w]hen we connect to WiFi in a coffee
shop, plug a hairdryer into an outlet, or place a phone call, we owe thanks to standard-setting
organizations.”2
THE GREAT BALTIMORE FIRE AND STANDARDS
The critical importance of interoperability standards is illustrated by the tragic story of the 1904
Baltimore fire. At the outbreak of the fire, which portended to be large, fire crews were called in
from as far away as Washington, D.C. But when they arrived, the crews discovered that their fire
hoses could not be coupled to the fire hydrants in Baltimore due to differences in shape, diameter
and thread count. As a result, the fire fighters stood by helplessly as more than seventy city blocks
were destroyed.

1

This Chapter deals with the contractual, pseudo-contractual and governance issues raised by technical
standard setting. Antitrust issues associated with standards development are discussed in Chapters 25
(Antitrust and Competition Issues) and 27 (IP Pools and Aggregators).

2

Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
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1. The SDO Ecosystem
Most of the technical standards currently deployed throughout the world were developed
collaboratively by market participants in voluntary standards-development organizations (SDOs,
sometimes referred to as “standard-setting organizations” or SSOs). SDOs range from large,
governmentally-recognized bodies that address a diverse range of standardization projects (e.g.,
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)), to established private sector groups that
address the standardization needs of major industry segments (e.g., the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and
Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)) to smaller groups often referred to as
“consortia” that focus on one or a handful of related standards (e.g., the HDMI Forum, Bluetooth
Special Interest Group, USB Forum). Because of the significant market benefits that are made
possible by technical standards, a high degree of cooperation among competitors has long been
tolerated by antitrust and competition law authorities, which might otherwise discourage such
large-scale coordination efforts among competitors.3

A 2017 meeting of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [photo: the author]

3

See Chapter 25, Part H, for a discussion of antitrust issues and due process requirements for SDOs.
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2. Patents and Standards
Many of the technological features specified by standards can be patented. Such patents are
typically obtained by those participants in a standardization activity that make technical
contributions to the standard (SDOs themselves almost never obtain patent protection over their
standards). However, to the extent that patents cover technologies that are “essential” to the
implementation of a standard (“standards-essential patents” or “SEPs”), concerns can arise.
Ordinarily, if the manufacturer of a product that allegedly infringes a patent is unable, or does
not wish, to obtain a license on the terms offered by the patent holder, the manufacturer has three
options: stop selling the infringing product, design around the patent, or do neither and risk liability
as an infringer. With standardized products, however, the manufacturer’s choices are more limited,
as designing around the patent may be impossible or may make the product non-compliant with a
commercially necessary standard (e.g., who would sell a smartphone today without Wi-Fi
capability?). Moreover, once a standard is approved and released by an SDO, manufacturers may
make significant internal investments on the basis of the standard. In such cases, the cost of
switching from the standardized technology to an alternative technology may be prohibitive (a
situation often referred to as “lock-in”). Once manufacturers are locked into a particular
standardized technology, the holders of SEPs covering that technology may be able to extract fees
that exceed the value of their patented technology, simply because the manufacturer is unable to
switch to an alternative technology without incurring substantial costs. As explained by the Ninth
Circuit, “The tactic of withholding a license unless and until a manufacturer agrees to pay an
unduly high royalty rate for an SEP is referred to as ‘hold-up.’”4
The risk of hold-up is likely to increase as the number of parties holding SEPs covering a single
standard rises. Complex technological products may implement dozens, if not hundreds of
standards, each of which may be covered by hundreds or thousands of patents held by a wide range
of parties. As such, the aggregation of royalty demands by multiple patent holders could lead to
high costs on implementing standards-compliant products. This situation is sometimes referred to
as “royalty stacking”. Royalty stacking can arise “when a standard implicates numerous patents,
perhaps hundreds, if not thousands,” each of which bears a royalty that must be paid by product
manufacturers and which “may become excessive in the aggregate.”5 When royalty stacking
occurs, “(1) the cumulative royalties paid for patents incorporated into a standard exceed the value
of the feature implementing the standard, and (2) the aggregate royalties obtained for the various
features of a product exceed the value of the product itself.”6
3. SDO IP Policies
In order to mitigate the threats of patent hold-up and royalty stacking, many SDOs have
adopted internal policies that are binding on their participants. These policies fall into two general
categories: disclosure policies and licensing policies. Disclosure policies require SDO participants
to disclose SEPs that they hold, generally prior to the approval of a relevant standard. These
4

Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d at 1031 (citing Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209
(Fed. Cir. 2014)).

5

Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d at 1209.

6

Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d at 1031.
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disclosures are often made available to the public via the Internet. Early disclosure of SEPs enables
standards developers to decide whether or not to approve a design that is covered by these SEPS,
to choose an alternative, non-infringing technology, to modify a draft standard before it is
approved to eliminate the infringing feature, or to seek licenses to the patented technology.
Licensing policies, on the other hand, require SEP holders to grant manufacturers of
standardized products licenses to use their SEPs on terms that are either royalty-free (RF) or “fair,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). These commitments are intended to assure product
manufacturers that they will be able to obtain all SEP licenses necessary to manufacture a
standardized product. FRAND or RF licensing commitments are required of all SDOs accredited
by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and are also utilized widely among other
SDOs around the world.

Essential Requirements, Section 3.1.1.b

A holder of standards-essential patents must offer all implementers of the standard
“reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair
discrimination”

Before diving into the issues surrounding FRAND royalty rates, it is important to make two
ancillary points. First, a FRAND commitment, such as the one illustrated above, is not itself a
license. It is a promise to enter into a license. As such, it is a binding obligation, but it is not itself
a conveyance of rights to the licensee.7 Second, most SDO licensing commitments require that all
terms of a SEP license be fair and reasonable, not only the royalty provisions. For obvious reasons,
royalty rates have gotten most of the attention in recent FRAND litigation (see below), but there
are other significant terms in every FRAND license agreement that should not be ignored. In most
cases, these terms (scope, duration, disclaimers, indemnity, etc.) are similar or identical to
comparable terms in other patent license agreements, which are discussed elsewhere in this
volume. In many respects, FRAND patent licenses share similarities with open source code
software licenses (Chapter 19), inasmuch as they are non-exclusive and carry few or no warranties
or indemnities. Some have also required the licensee to grant a license in improvements, or its own

7

This point is discussed in Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and
Other Patent Pledges, 2015 Utah L. Rev. 479, 497-98 (2015).
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patents, back to the licensor, sometimes at no charge. A sample FRAND license agreement is
included in the Supplemental Materials at Appendix 20.1.
4. The Challenge of Defining FRAND Royalty Rates
Despite the appeal of FRAND licensing commitments, a consistent, practical, and readily
enforceable definition of the level of a FRAND royalty for a given patent/standard, or a
methodology for calculating FRAND royalties more generally, has proven difficult to achieve.
Virtually no SDO defines precisely what this phrase means, and many SDOs affirmatively
disclaim any role in establishing, interpreting, or adjudicating the reasonableness of FRAND
royalties. As explained in the common patent policy adopted by ISO, ITU and IEC, “The detailed
arrangements arising from patents (licensing, royalties, etc.) are left to the parties concerned, as
these arrangements might differ from case to case.” Some SDOs even go so far as to prohibit
discussions of royalties and other licensing terms at SDO meetings, making the development of a
consensus view on the precise meaning of FRAND difficult. This lack of clarity has contributed
to litigation over FRAND commitments.
These disputes have arisen when a SEP holder and a product manufacturer cannot agree on the
terms of a license and there is disagreement whether the patent holder’s proposed royalty is
“reasonable.” However, FRAND disputes can also involve the reasonableness of non-royalty
terms, such as requirements that the vendor license-back its own patents to the patent holder
(“reciprocity”) or that the license be “suspended” if the manufacturer threatens the patent holder
with litigation (“defensive suspension”). When parties cannot agree on license terms, no license is
granted and any product that conforms to a standard may infringe the patent holder’s SEPs. The
parties are thus left in a difficult and ambiguous situation, which has led to a vigorous debate
within industry, government, and academia regarding the scope and contour of FRAND
obligations. Some of the specific issues arising in these disputes are discussed in the following
sections.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Essentiality. The SDO disclosure and licensing policies described above relate primarily
to patents that are “essential” to the SDO’s standards. This qualifier is important, as SDOs would
likely be overstepping their bounds if they sought to require patent holders to disclose or license
patents that did not directly impact a manufacturer’s ability to implement the SDO’s standards.
But what, exactly, does “essential” mean? This question has been heavily debated, and SDOs
generally take one of three approaches. Some speak in terms of patents that are “technically”
essential to a standard, some speak in terms of those that are “commercially” essential, and some
do not specify which of these approaches they prefer. The following excerpt highlights some of
the issues that can arise with respect to this critical definition:
One major divide among SDO patent policies is whether they define an “essential”
patent claim as covering a technology that must, as a technical or engineering
matter, be included in a product implementing a standard (technical essentiality) or
whether that patented technology, though not strictly required as a technical matter,
is the only commercially feasible way that the standard can be implemented (i.e.,
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considering factors such as manufacturing cost, efficiency, reliability,
manufacturability, etc.) (commercial essentiality).
For example, suppose that a municipal electrical standard specifies a range of
tolerances (pressure, temperature, corrosion resistance, puncture resistance, etc.)
for wiring conduits. Such conduits are typically made from aluminum, though other
materials could also be used to make such conduits. Thus, a patent covering the use
of aluminum conduits for wiring would not be technically essential to the standard,
as one could use various other materials. But suppose that the only alternative
material that met the other tolerance requirements of the specification were gold.
Aluminum conduit costs an average of $0.15 per meter, while gold conduit, if such
a thing were ever made, would cost $2,000.00 per meter. Under this scenario, a
patent covering aluminum conduit might no longer be considered technically
essential to the standard, as gold, technically speaking, could also be used to make
compliant conduits. Nevertheless, given these two alternatives, there is no
commercially feasible alternative to aluminum. Thus, when the only technical
substitute for aluminum conduit is significantly more costly, a patent covering the
use of aluminum conduit would likely be commercially essential to the standard.
But what if, in addition to aluminum and gold, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) is also a
suitable material for conduit which meets all the requirements of the specification.
PVC costs $0.45 per meter: three times more than aluminum, but far less than gold.
Is PVC, at three times the cost of aluminum, a commercially feasible substitute for
aluminum? If so, is an aluminum conduit patent still commercially essential to the
implementation of the conduit standard? What if the cost of PVC conduit dropped
to $0.25 per meter? Or to $0.16? Just how different must the qualities and pricing
of a substitute technology (PVC) be before another technology (aluminum) is no
longer considered commercially essential to the standard?
This question of degree must be factored into the analysis by SDOs deciding how
to define essentiality. While technical essentiality may seem rather unforgiving and
unfairly exclude some patents from the reach of the SDO’s policy (e.g., a patent on
aluminum conduit, when gold exists as a technically-, though not commerciallyfeasible, alternative), the virtually limitless gradations of pricing, quality and
availability that factor into commercial manufacturing decisions could make
determinations as to commercial essentiality hopelessly fraught.8
What advantages and drawbacks do each of the approaches outlined above have for SDO
participants, the SDO itself, and the standards that are developed? Given these considerations, how
would you define “essentiality” in a new SDO’s patent policy?
2. De Facto Standards. The standards discussed in this chapter are generally known as
“voluntary consensus standards” and are developed by groups of competitors within SDOs.
However, not all standards are created in this way. Several important standards that are widely
deployed in the market were developed by a single firm and became so broadly used that they have
8

Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standards Essential Patents in Cambridge Handbook Of Technical
Standardization Law: Competition, Antitrust, and Patents, 209, 217-18 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press: 2017).
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come to be considered standards (generally known as “de facto” standards). An example is
Adobe’s Portable Document Format (PDF). Though Adobe originally developed PDF as a
proprietary document format, PDF has become so widespread that Adobe has made available the
tools necessary to read and convert PDF documents to the industry generally. Yet because Adobe
developed PDF on its own and without the involvement of an SDO, the standard carries no
FRAND or other licensing commitments to third parties. Should firms like Adobe be required to
license patents covering de facto standards to others, including their competitors? Some
commentators have argued that they should, while others worry that doing so could be
problematic.9 What do you think?
3. Patent Pools. As discussed in Chapter 27, patent pools are created when the holders of
patents wish to license their patents collectively, at uniform rates via a single point of contact.
Over the years, patent pools have formed to facilitate the licensing of patents covering several
important standards including Advanced Audio Coding (AAC), Digital Video Broadcast (DVB),
Compact Disc (CD) and Digital Video Disc (DVD). The Department of Justice has reviewed
several of these pooling arrangements and has generally concluded that they are likely to have
significant procompetitive effects.10
Yet most SDO-developed standards are not associated with patent pools, and the licensing of
SEPs is conducted on a bilateral basis between individual SEP holders and product manufacturers.
One recent study found that of more than 250 standards implemented in a new laptop computer,
only 3% of them were subject to SEP licensing under a patent pool, while 75% were covered by
FRAND licensing policies and 22% were subject to royalty-free licensing.11
One of the principal reasons patent pools are used infrequently in the context of voluntary
consensus standards relates to “essentiality”, discussed in Note 1 above.
[P]atent pools must ensure, with a high degree of certainty, that all patents placed
in the pool are essential. This requirement flows from the risk that a patent pool
may stifle competition if it contains patents covering substitute technologies.
Under this theory, including substitute technologies in the pool could effectively
fix prices on competing technologies. For this reason, the parties forming patent
pools typically engage in a lengthy and expensive process (usually through external
counsel engaged for the purpose) of vetting each patent that is proposed to be
included in the pool and ensuring its essentiality.

9

Compare Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 Calif.
L. Rev. 1, 4 (2009) (arguing that Adobe and other holders of de facto standards should be required to make
their patents broadly available under the doctrine of equitable estoppel) with Contreras, Market Reliance,
supra note 7, at 522-23 (significant mischief could ensue from requiring involuntary licensing of proprietary
technologies).

10

U.S. Dep’t Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement And Intellectual Property Rights:
Promoting Innovation and Competition 71 (2007).

11

Brad Biddle, Andrew White & Sean Woods, How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical
Questions), Int’l Telecomm. Union Sec. Telecomm. Standardization Kaleidoscope Acad. Conf. Proc. 123
(2010).
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Such a vetting process would typically be cost-prohibitive in the context of SDObased standards. Some SDOs produce hundreds or thousands of standards in a wide
range of product areas. Many SDO standards are never widely adopted or have
limited application, so much of an up-front investment of resources to determine
essentiality would be wasted. In contrast, relatively little up-front investment is
required to identify SEPs in SDOs: patents are voluntarily declared essential by
patent holders and essentiality is not tested unless and until litigation ensues. While
this structure relies on litigation to resolve questions regarding patent essentiality,
its significant up-front cost savings makes it far more desirable in the SDO
context.12
Given these differences, do you see any way to increase the efficiency of SEP licensing for
SDOs?

SEPs covering many important standards are licensed through patent pools
B.

Patent Disclosure Policies

As discussed above, many SDOs require that their participants disclose patents that are likely
to be “essential” to standards under development by the SDO. However, the specific conditions
under which such disclosures must be made are sometimes hazy. The cases in this section address
what happens when an SDO participant allegedly fails to comply with its obligation to disclose
SEPs to an SDO.

12

Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79
Antitrust L.J. 47, 76-77 (2013).
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QUALCOMM INC. V. BROADCOM CORP.
548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
PROST, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
I. BACKGROUND
This case presents the question of whether Qualcomm waived its right to assert its patents by
failing to disclose them to the JVT SSO. The asserted patents relate to video compression
technology. The ’104 Patent issued in 1995 and is entitled, “Adaptive Block Size Image
Compression Method and System.” The ’767 Patent issued in 1996 and is entitled, “Interframe
Video Encoding and Decoding System.” Qualcomm is the assignee of the ’104 and ’767 Patents.
In late 2001, the JVT was established as a joint project by two parent SSOs: (1) the Video
Coding Experts Group (“VCEG”) of the International Telecommunication Union
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (“ITU-T”); and (2) the Moving Picture Experts Group
(“MPEG”) of the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”). The JVT was created to develop a single “technically
aligned, fully interoperable” industry standard for video compression technology. The standard
developed by the JVT was later named the H.264 standard. In May 2003, the ITU-T and ISO/IEC
adopted and published the official H.264 standard.
Plaintiff Qualcomm is a member of the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”),
which is the United States representative member body in the ISO/IEC, and was an active duespaying member for many years prior to 2001. It is also a member of the ITU-T and a participant
in the JVT. Qualcomm did not disclose the ’104 and ’767 Patents to the JVT prior to release of the
H.264 standard in May 2003.
On October 14, 2005, Qualcomm filed the present lawsuit against Broadcom in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California, claiming that Broadcom infringed the
’104 and ’767 Patents by making products compliant with the H.264 video compression standard.
A jury trial was held from January 9, 2007, to January 26, 2007. The jury returned a unanimous
verdict as to non-infringement and validity, finding that (1) Broadcom does not infringe the ’104
and ’767 Patents; and (2) the ’104 and ’767 Patents were not shown to be invalid. The jury also
returned a unanimous advisory verdict as to the equitable issues, finding by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) the ’104 Patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct; and (2) the ’104 and
’767 Patents are unenforceable due to waiver.
On March 21, 2007, the district court entered an order (1) finding in favor of Qualcomm and
against Broadcom on Broadcom’s counterclaim of inequitable conduct as to the ’104 Patent; (2)
finding in favor of Broadcom and against Qualcomm on Broadcom’s affirmative defense of waiver
as to the ’104 and ’767 Patents; and (3) setting a hearing on an Order to Show Cause as to the
appropriate remedy for Qualcomm’s waiver. The district court’s conclusion that Qualcomm
waived its rights to assert the ’104 and ’767 Patents was based on Qualcomm’s conduct before the
JVT.
Throughout discovery, motions practice, trial, and even post-trial, Qualcomm adamantly
maintained that it did not participate in the JVT during development of the H.264 standard. Despite
9
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numerous requests for production and interrogatories requesting documents relating to
Qualcomm’s JVT participation prior to adoption of the H.264 standard, Qualcomm repeatedly
represented to the court that it had no such documents or emails. On January 24, 2007, however,
one of the last days of trial, a Qualcomm witness testified that she had emails that Qualcomm
previously claimed did not exist. Later that day, Qualcomm produced twenty-one emails belonging
to that witness. As the district court later discovered, these emails were just the “tip of the iceberg,”
as over two hundred thousand more pages of emails and electronic documents were produced posttrial. The district court later determined that these documents and emails “indisputably demonstrate
that Qualcomm participated in the JVT from as early as January 2002, that Qualcomm witnesses .
. . and other engineers were all aware of and a part of this participation, and that Qualcomm
knowingly attempted in trial to continue the concealment of evidence.”
On August 6, 2007, after a hearing on the Order to Show Cause, the district court entered an
Order on Remedy for Finding of Waiver, ordering the ’104 and ’767 Patents (and their
continuations, continuations-in-part, divisions, reissues, and any other derivatives thereof)
unenforceable against the world.
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
By failing to disclose relevant intellectual property rights (“IPR”) to an SSO prior to the
adoption of a standard, a “patent holder is in a position to ’hold up’ industry participants from
implementing the standard. Industry participants who have invested significant resources
developing products and technologies that conform to the standard will find it prohibitively
expensive to abandon their investment and switch to another standard.” In order to avoid “patent
hold-up,” many SSOs require participants to disclose and/or give up IPR covering a standard.
In Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, this court considered the question of whether the
plaintiff, Rambus, had a duty to disclose information about patents or patent applications to the
Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (“JEDEC”), which is an SSO associated with the
Electronic Industries Alliance (“EIA”). 318 F.3d 1081, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2003). It stated that,
“[b]efore determining whether Rambus withheld information about patents or applications in the
face of a duty to disclose, this court first must ascertain what duty Rambus owed JEDEC.” In
determining what duty, if any, Rambus owed JEDEC, our court considered both the language of
the written EIA/JEDEC IPR policy and the members’ treatment of said language. It determined
that the written policy did not impose a direct duty on members expressly requiring disclosure of
IPR information. “Nevertheless, because JEDEC members treated the language of [the policy] as
imposing a disclosure duty, this court likewise treat[ed] this language as imposing a disclosure
duty.”
After considering evidence regarding the JEDEC members’ understanding of the JEDEC
policy, this court determined that “Rambus’s duty to disclose extended only to claims in patents
or applications that reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard.” Applying that
rationale to the claims at issue and the evidence in the case, it stated that “[t]he record shows that
Rambus’s claimed technology did not fall within the JEDEC disclosure duty.” Accordingly, this
court concluded that “substantial evidence does not support the jury’s verdict that Rambus
breached its duties under the EIA/JEDEC policy.”

10
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Chip designer Rambus was at the center of some of the largest standards-related patent
disputes of the 2000s.
A. Existence of Disclosure Duty
Determining whether Qualcomm had a duty to disclose the ’104 and ’767 Patents to the JVT
involves two questions. First, we must determine whether the written JVT IPR policies impose
any disclosure obligations on participants (apart from the submission of technical proposals).
Second, to the extent the written JVT IPR policies are ambiguous, we must determine whether the
JVT participants understood the policies as imposing such obligations.
The district court first considered the written JVT IPR policies. Specifically, the district court
considered the JVT ToR, which encompass patent and copyright IPR. As the district court noted,
the IPR disclosure provisions of the JVT IPR policies apply to Qualcomm, as a member of the
ITU-T and participant in the JVT.
Section 3 of the JVT ToR is entitled “IPR Policy & Guidelines.” Subsection 3.2, entitled
“Collection of IPR information during the standardization process,” reads:
According to the ITU-T and ISO/IEC IPR policy, members/experts are encouraged
to disclose as soon as possible IPR information (of their own or anyone else’s)
associated with any standardization proposal (of their own or anyone else’s). Such
information should be provided on a best effort basis. …

11
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As the district court observed, it is clear from a review of the JVT IPR policies that
identification of IPR by JVT participants is critical to the development of an effective industry
standard.
On appeal, the threshold dispute between the parties is whether the written JVT IPR policies
impose any disclosure duty on participants apart from the submission of technical proposals.
Qualcomm argues that the written JVT IPR policies require disclosure only when a technical
proposal is made, and that disclosure is merely encouraged from participants not submitting
technical proposals. Broadcom, however, argues that the written policies of both the JVT and its
parent organizations impose disclosure obligations on participants (apart from the submission of
technical proposals). Additionally, Broadcom submits that, to the extent there is any ambiguity in
the written policies, the understanding of the JVT participants controls.
Pointing to subsection 3.2, Qualcomm argues that the express language of the written JVT
policies only requires disclosure when a technical proposal is made, and that disclosure is merely
“encouraged” from participants not making technical proposals. Thus, Qualcomm argues that the
district court erred in holding that Qualcomm waived patent rights by breaching an “unwritten”
JVT disclosure duty. In addition to the language of subsection 3.2, Qualcomm points to the JVT
patent disclosure form, which states: “JVT requires that all technical contributions be accompanied
with this form. Anyone with knowledge of any patent affecting the use of JVT work, of their own
or any other entity (’third parties’), is strongly encouraged to submit this form as well.”
As Broadcom notes, however, subsection 3.2 expressly incorporates a “best effort[s]” standard.
When asked at oral argument whether there is any evidence in the record that Qualcomm made
any efforts, let alone best efforts, to disclose IPR information associated with any standardization
proposal, Qualcomm responded, “No, we didn’t because we did not view that as imposing a duty
on us.” On rebuttal, Qualcomm clarified this response by arguing that the use of best efforts is
merely “encouraged,” not required.
We disagree with Qualcomm’s reading of subsection 3.2. While Qualcomm places much
emphasis on the use of the word “encouraged” in subsection 3.2, we agree with Broadcom that,
when considered in light of the relevant context, this language applies to the timing of the
disclosure (i.e., encouraged to disclose as soon as possible), not the disclosure duty itself. Thus,
while the language of the JVT IPR policies may not expressly require disclosure by all participants
in all circumstances (e.g., if relevant IPR is not disclosed despite the use of best efforts), it at least
incorporates a best efforts standard (even apart from the submission of technical proposals). By
Qualcomm’s own admission, it did not present evidence of any efforts, much less best efforts, to
disclose patents associated with the standardization proposal (of their own or anyone else’s) to the
JVT prior to the release of the H.264 standard.
In sum, we conclude that Qualcomm, as a participant in the JVT prior to the release of the
H.264 standard, did have IPR disclosure obligations, as discussed above, under the written policies
of both the JVT and its parent organizations.
JVT Participants’ Understanding of the JVT IPR Policies
Even if we were to read the written IPR policies as not unambiguously requiring by themselves
the aforementioned disclosure obligations, our conclusion as to the disclosure obligations of JVT
participants would nonetheless be the same. That is because the language of the JVT IPR policies
coupled with the district court’s unassailable findings and conclusions as to the JVT participants’
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understanding of the policies further establishes that the policies imposed disclosure duties on
participants (apart from the submission of technical proposals). As previously discussed, even
though the Rambus court determined that there was not an express disclosure duty in the JEDEC
patent policy in that case, it treated the policy as imposing a disclosure duty because the members
treated it as imposing a disclosure duty.
In the present case, while the district court concluded that there was no express disclosure
requirement in the written policies apart from the submission of technical proposals, it found “clear
and convincing evidence that JVT participants treated the JVT IPR Policies as imposing a duty to
disclose,” and “that Qualcomm was aware of this treatment as early as August 2002,” prior to the
release of the H.264 standard in May 2003. Specifically, the district court noted that, “like Rambus,
in addition to the written guidelines, JVT participants also learned of the patent disclosure policy
from attendance of JVT meetings.”
The district court considered witness testimony, including testimony from Qualcomm
employees, indicating that it was the practice of the chairman of the JVT, Gary Sullivan, to discuss
the JVT IPR policies at every meeting. The district court also considered testimony indicating that
JVT participants sometimes submitted disclosures without an accompanying technical proposal.
Qualcomm attempts to distinguish Rambus by arguing that the JEDEC patent policy in Rambus
was silent as to whether members had a disclosure duty, while the written JVT IPR policies are
“unambiguous,” and “expressly specify disclosure duties only in conjunction with a submission”.
Thus, Qualcomm argues that the district court erred by inferring a disclosure duty that is “directly
contrary to the written JVT policy.” As previously discussed, however, we disagree with
Qualcomm’s interpretation of the written JVT IPR policies in the present case. Moreover, even if
we were to read the written IPR policies as not unambiguously requiring by themselves the
aforementioned disclosure obligations, the disclosure duty found by the district court based on the
understanding of the JVT participants is certainly not “directly contrary to the written JVT policy.”
B. Scope of Disclosure Duty
Having concluded that Qualcomm, as a participant in the JVT prior to release of the H.264
standard, had a duty to disclose patents, we turn to the question of the scope of the disclosure duty.
In Rambus, although the JEDEC IPR policy did not use the language “related to,” the parties
consistently agreed that the policy required disclosure of patents “related to” the standardization
work of the committee. The parties disagreed, however, in their interpretation of “related to”. The
court considered evidence regarding the JEDEC members’ understanding of the JEDEC policy,
and concluded that “Rambus’s duty to disclose extended only to claims in patents or applications
that reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard”. The court reasoned that, “[t]o hold
otherwise would contradict the record evidence and render the JEDEC disclosure duty unbounded.
Under such an amorphous duty, any patent or application having a vague relationship to the
standard would have to be disclosed”. The court noted, “[j]ust as lack of compliance with a welldefined patent policy would chill participation in open standard-setting bodies, after-the-fact
morphing of a vague, loosely defined policy to capture actions not within the actual scope of that
policy likewise would chill participation in open standard-setting bodies.”
In the present case, the district court noted that the JVT IPR policies refer to IPR information
“associated with” any standardization proposal or “affecting the use” of JVT work. Applying the
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reasoning of Rambus, the district court concluded that this language requires only that JVT
participants disclose patents that “reasonably might be necessary” to practice the H.264 standard.
To hold otherwise, the district court explained, “would render the JVT disclosure duty
inappropriately ’unbounded,’ ’amorphous,’ and ’vague.’”
On appeal, Qualcomm argues that we should reject the district court’s formulation of the
“reasonably might be necessary” standard. Qualcomm characterizes the “reasonably might be
necessary” formulation from Rambus as follows: “it must be reasonably clear at the time that the
patent or application would actually be necessary to practice the standard.” Thus, according to
Qualcomm, when the Rambus court explained the standard in terms of whether the patent or
application “reasonably might be necessary” to practice the standard, the court really meant that
the patent or application must “actually be necessary” to practice the standard. Qualcomm submits
that “[i]t is nonsensical to conceive that an SSO would require disclosure to design a standard
around a patent when the standard does not read on the patent in the first place.”
We disagree with Qualcomm’s characterization of the standard applied in Rambus. The plain
language used by the Rambus court (“reasonably might be necessary”) contradicts Qualcomm’s
claim that the Rambus formulation requires that a patent must “actually be necessary” in order to
trigger a disclosure duty. The Rambus court explained the “reasonably might be necessary”
standard by stating that “the disclosure duty operates when a reasonable competitor would not
expect to practice the standard without a license under the undisclosed claims.”
It further clarified that the “reasonably might be necessary” standard is an objective standard,
which “does not depend on a member’s subjective belief that its patents do or do not read on the
proposed standard.” Likewise, in the present case, we agree with the district court that the language
requires JVT participants to disclose patents that “reasonably might be necessary” to practice the
H.264 standard. This is an objective standard, which applies when a reasonable competitor would
not expect to practice the H.264 standard without a license under the undisclosed claims. This
formulation does not require that the patents ultimately must “actually be necessary” to practice
the H.264 standard.
C. Breach of Disclosure Duty
Having concluded that the proper scope of the disclosure duty requires JVT participants to
disclose patents that “reasonably might be necessary” to practice the H.264 standard, we next
address the question of whether Qualcomm breached this disclosure duty. It is undisputed that
Qualcomm did not disclose the ’104 and ’767 Patents to the JVT prior to the release of the H.264
standard. Thus, Qualcomm breached its disclosure duty if, as the district court found by clear and
convincing evidence, the ’104 and ’767 Patents “reasonably might be necessary” to practice the
H.264 standard.
As previously mentioned, the district court found clear and convincing evidence that the ’104
and ’767 Patents “reasonably might be necessary” to practice the H.264 standard. In reaching this
conclusion, the district court relied on the testimony from several Qualcomm witnesses. For
example, the district court relied on testimony from Qualcomm’s H.264 expert, who testified at
trial that “the claims of the [’104] patent map onto the H.264 standard, so that devices or systems
that practice H.264 actually practice claims of the ‘104 patent.” Additionally, inter alia, the district
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court relied on an email from a Qualcomm employee discussing the coverage of the ’767 Patent,
and describing it as a “core patent relevant to H.264.”
Qualcomm argues that the finding of non-infringement here refutes any finding that it breached
a disclosure duty. Broadcom responds, however, that it is inconsistent for Qualcomm to now argue
that the asserted patents do not meet the “reasonably might be necessary” standard, when
Qualcomm accused Broadcom’s products of infringement in this case solely because they
practiced the H.264 standard. Broadcom also points to testimony of Qualcomm’s own JVT
participants in support of its claim that JVT participants considered that the asserted patents
“reasonably might be necessary” to practice the H.264 standard.
On appeal, Qualcomm does not present any arguments comparing the asserted claims to the
H.264 standard in an attempt to show that they do not meet the “reasonably might be necessary”
formulation. Indeed, Broadcom argues that if Qualcomm truly believes that the asserted patents
do not meet the “reasonably might be necessary” standard, then it necessarily lacked a Rule 11
basis to bring this litigation in the first place.
We are not persuaded by Qualcomm’s arguments on this point, and are unable to reconcile its
ex post argument that the asserted patents do not meet the “reasonably might be necessary”
standard with its ex ante arguments regarding infringement. Based on the foregoing, we conclude
that the district court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence that the ’104 and ’767
Patents fell within the “reasonably might be necessary” standard. Thus, the district court properly
determined that Qualcomm breached its disclosure duty by failing to disclose the ’104 and ’767
Patents to the JVT prior to the release of the H.264 standard in May 2003.
Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether it was within the district court’s equitable
authority to enter an unenforceability remedy in this case.
D. Equitable Remedies
The district court analyzed the consequence of Qualcomm’s failure to disclose the ’104 and
’767 Patents under the framework of waiver as a consequence of silence in the face of a duty to
speak. The parties disagree on whether waiver was the appropriate equitable framework, and
whether the scope of the unenforceability remedy was within the district court’s equitable
authority.
Waiver
First, we address the question of whether waiver was the appropriate equitable doctrine to
apply in this case. Qualcomm argues that the district court’s findings do not constitute waiver as a
matter of law. It argues that “true waiver” requires a voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a
known right.
Specifically, Qualcomm claims that the district court’s findings in this case run directly
contrary to any claim that Qualcomm intended to voluntarily waive its patent rights. On this point,
we agree with Qualcomm. The following finding by the district court certainly suggests that
Qualcomm did not intend to waive its patent rights:
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm intentionally
organized a plan of action to shield the ’104 and ’767 patents from consideration
by the JVT with the anticipation that (1) the resulting H.264 standard would
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infringe those patents and (2) Qualcomm would then have an opportunity to be an
indispensable licensor to anyone in the world seeking to produce an H.264compliant product.
Therefore, rather than establishing that Qualcomm intentionally relinquished its rights, the
district court’s findings demonstrate that Qualcomm intentionally organized a plan to shield its
patents from consideration by the JVT, intending to later obtain royalties from H.264-compliant
products. Thus, in these circumstances, it appears that “true waiver” is not the appropriate
framework.
As Broadcom notes, however, the district court’s formulation of the law of waiver was not
limited to “true waiver,” but also addressed “implied waiver.” The district court’s advisory jury
instruction stated:
In order to prove waiver, Broadcom must show by clear and convincing evidence
either that Qualcomm, with full knowledge of the material facts, intentionally
relinquished its rights to enforce the 104 and 767 patents or that its conduct was so
inconsistent with an intent to enforce its rights as to induce a reasonable belief that
such right has been relinquished.
Broadcom submits that “[t]he second element of that instruction correctly states the longestablished doctrine of implied waiver.”
Qualcomm responds that “[e]ven if a duty to disclose had been breached, this breach is best
explained as negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness, which does not create a waiver.” In the
present case, however, the district court found clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm knew
that the asserted patents “reasonably might be necessary” to practice that H.264 standard, and that
it intentionally did not disclose them to the JVT. These findings demonstrate much more than
“negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness.”
Qualcomm also argues that any “nondisclosure did not cause any harm to Broadcom or any
other entity.” Qualcomm submits that there is no harm because (1) the jury’s non-infringement
verdict conclusively establishes that the asserted patents are not needed to produce H.264compliant products, and (2) even if the asserted patents were needed to practice the H.264 standard,
Qualcomm would be willing to license them. We disagree. Even if Qualcomm agreed not to pursue
an injunction in this case, injunctions are not the only type of harm. Forcing a party to accept a
license and pay whatever fee the licensor demands, or to undergo the uncertainty and cost of
litigation (which in this case was substantial), are significant burdens.
Qualcomm further argues that “[t]he district court never found detrimental reliance by
Broadcom because of its misconception that such reliance is not an element of a defense premised
on conduct that allegedly is objectively misleading to a reasonable person.” In essence, it appears
that Qualcomm wants to benefit from its intentional nondisclosure of the asserted patents by
arguing that Broadcom cannot succeed on an implied waiver defense without specific findings as
to detrimental reliance by Broadcom.
We disagree with Qualcomm’s contention that the district court’s findings in this case were
insufficient to support the application of an implied waiver defense. The district court found that
JVT participants understood the JVT IPR policies as imposing a disclosure duty, that Qualcomm
participated in the JVT prior to release of the H.264 standard, and that Qualcomm was silent in the
face of its disclosure duty. Indeed, the district court stated that “participants in the JVT project
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shared the aims and policies of the JVT and considered themselves obligated to identify IPR owned
or known by them, whether or not they made technical proposals for study.” As the district court
noted, “Broadcom, ignorant of the existence of the ’104 and ’767 patents, designed and is in the
process of manufacturing numerous H.264-compliant products.” In light of the record in this case
in its entirety, it would be improper to allow Qualcomm to rely on the effect of its misconduct to
shield it from the application of the equitable defense of implied waiver.
In sum, we agree with the district court that, “[a] duty to speak can arise from a group
relationship in which the working policy of disclosure of related intellectual property rights (’IPR’)
is treated by the group as a whole as imposing an obligation to disclose information in order to
support and advance the purposes of the group.” Not only did the district court find that Qualcomm
was silent in the face of a disclosure duty in the SSO context, it also found clear and convincing
evidence that Qualcomm had knowledge, prior to the adoption of the H.264 standard in May 2003,
that the JVT participants understood the policies as imposing a disclosure duty, that the asserted
patents “reasonably might be necessary” to practice the H.264 standard, and that Qualcomm
intentionally organized a plan to shield said patents from consideration by the JVT, planning to
demand license fees from those seeking to produce H.264-compliant products. Then, after
participating in the JVT and shielding the asserted patents from consideration during development
of the H.264 standard, Qualcomm filed a patent infringement lawsuit against Broadcom, alleging
infringement primarily, if not solely, based on Broadcom’s H.264 compliance. In these
circumstances, we conclude that it was within the district court’s authority, sitting as a court of
equity, to determine that Qualcomm’s misconduct falls within the doctrine of waiver.
Unenforceability Remedy
On August 6, 2007, after a hearing on the Order to Show Cause, the district court entered an
Order on Remedy for Finding of Waiver, ordering the ’104 and ’767 Patents (and their
continuations, continuations-in-part, divisions, reissues, and any other derivatives thereof)
unenforceable against the world. In reaching this conclusion, the district court rejected
Qualcomm’s argument that Broadcom may not have any remedies beyond itself, because it raised
waiver as an affirmative defense rather than as a counterclaim or cross-claim. The district court
noted that this court has upheld the unenforceability of a patent to the world due to inequitable
conduct even when pled as an affirmative defense.
Qualcomm argues that the remedy of unenforceability entered on Broadcom’s defense of
waiver is contrary to law. It submits that once the jury returned a non-infringement verdict the
district court lacked any legal basis to consider the affirmative defense of waiver. It appears to
base this argument largely on the fact that Broadcom pled waiver only as an affirmative defense,
as opposed to a counterclaim. Thus, Qualcomm argues that, because waiver was pled as an
affirmative defense, it cannot result in a judgment of unenforceability. We disagree. It was entirely
appropriate for the district court to address the defense of waiver after the jury returned a noninfringement verdict. As the district court noted, this court has upheld judgments of
unenforceability based on inequitable conduct even where pled as an affirmative defense. We see
no reason why an affirmative defense of waiver cannot similarly result in a judgment of
unenforceability.
Broadcom also submits that “[t]he district court, sitting in equity, had the authority to grant
relief as a result of Qualcomm’s conduct.” By analogy, it claims that successful assertion of the
defenses of inequitable conduct, equitable estoppel, and patent misuse has resulted in
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unenforceability judgments. In response to Broadcom’s analogy to inequitable conduct,
Qualcomm argues “the rationale for a remedy of unenforceability for inequitable conduct before
the PTO--that such conduct taints the property right ab initio--is simply not present for waiver
based on post-PTO conduct before a private SSO.” In response to the patent misuse analogy,
Qualcomm states that “[w]hen patent misuse is proven, a court may temporarily suspend the
owner’s ability to enforce the patent while the improper practice and its effects remain ongoing.”
In addition to the analogy to inequitable conduct, we find the remedy of unenforceability based
on post-issuance patent misuse instructive in this case. As Qualcomm notes, the successful
assertion of patent misuse may render a patent unenforceable until the misconduct can be purged;
it does not render the patent unenforceable for all time. In B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories, this court stated:
[T]he patent misuse doctrine is an extension of the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands, whereby a court of equity will not lend its support to enforcement of a patent
that has been misused. Patent misuse arose, as an equitable defense available to the
accused infringer, from the desire to restrain practices that did not in themselves
violate any law, but that drew anticompetitive strength from the patent right, and
thus were deemed to be contrary to public policy. When used successfully, this
defense results in rendering the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged.
124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In light of the foregoing, we agree with Qualcomm that
patent misuse does not render a patent unenforceable for all time. Contrary to Qualcomm’s
arguments, however, the limited scope of unenforceability in the patent misuse context does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that an unenforceability remedy is unavailable in the waiver
context in the present case. Instead, we conclude that a district court may in appropriate
circumstances order patents unenforceable as a result of silence in the face of an SSO disclosure
duty, as long as the scope of the district court’s unenforceability remedy is properly limited in
relation to the underlying breach.
While the scope of an unenforceability remedy in the patent misuse context is limited to
rendering the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged, the scope of the district court’s
unenforceability remedy in the present case was not limited in relation to Qualcomm’s misconduct
in the SSO context. The basis for Broadcom’s waiver defense was Qualcomm’s conduct before
the JVT during development of the H.264 standard, including intentional nondisclosure of patents
that it knew “reasonably might be necessary” to practice the standard. The district court correctly
recognized that the remedy for waiver in the SSO context should not be automatic, but should be
fashioned to give a fair, just, and equitable response reflective of the offending conduct. In
determining the appropriate equitable remedy in this case, the district court properly considered
the extent of the materiality of the withheld information and the circumstances of the nondisclosure
relating to the JVT proceedings. While we agree with the district court that there is an “obvious
connection between the ’104 and ’767 patents and H.264 compliant products,” we do not discern
such a connection between the asserted patents and products that are not H.264-compliant, and
neither party points us to any such connection.
Accordingly, based on the district court’s findings, the broadest permissible unenforceability
remedy in the circumstances of the present case would be to render the ’104 and ’767 Patents (and
their continuations, continuations-in-part, divisions, reissues, and any other derivatives thereof)
unenforceable against all H.264-compliant products (including the accused products in this case,
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as well as any other current or future H.264-compliant products). Accordingly, we vacate the
unenforceability remedy and remand with instructions to enter an unenforceability remedy limited
in scope to any H.264-compliant products.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Rambus v. Infineon. Perhaps the best-known case of a failure to disclose patents to an SDO
Rambus, Inc., a developer of semiconductor memory technology. Much has been written about the
decade-long legal battles in which Rambus sought to assert its patents against implementers of
dynamic random access memory (DRAM) technology standardized by the Joint Electron Device
Engineering Council (JEDEC), a voluntary SDO in which Rambus participated in the early 1990s.
In the cases (which involved U.S. and EU enforcement agencies, as well as multiple semiconductor
companies), Rambus escaped liability largely because some (but not all) of the triers of fact
determined that that the JEDEC patent policy was too vague to prohibit the conduct that Rambus
was alleged to have committed. Or, as concluded by the Federal Circuit in Rambus v. Infineon
(Fed. Cir. 2003), the JEDEC policy suffered from “a staggering lack of defining details” that left
SDO participants with “vaguely defined expectations as to what they believe the policy requires.”
In hindsight, it is easy to criticize JEDEC and its counsel for poor drafting, but can you think of
any factors that might have led to the deliberate creation of such an imprecise policy?
2. Policy Language. The outcome of Broadcom hangs on whether or not Qualcomm had a
duty to disclose two of its patents to JVT. The court concedes that the language of JVT’s patent
policy does not expressly create this obligation, yet imposes this obligation on Qualcomm based
on the general understanding of JVT participants. Is it valid to impose a legal obligation based on
non-lawyers’ (mis)understanding of legal policies? How does the court reconcile its holding with
that of Rambus v. Infineon, in which no duty to disclose was found under a similarly unclear
policy?
3. Non-infringement. At the district court, the jury found that Qualcomm’s patents were not
infringed by Broadcom. What does this finding imply regarding the essentiality of Qualcomm’s
patents to the H.264 standard? Why did the Federal Circuit give little weight to the jury’s noninfringement finding or Qualcomm’s argument that, as a result, Broadcom suffered no harm from
Qualcomm’s failure to disclose the patents at issue?
4. Unenforceability. In Broadcom, the district court held that Qualcomm’s undisclosed
patents were unenforceable as against the entire world. The Federal Circuit vacated this holding
and remanded to narrow the scope of the unenforceability remedy. Was this a victory for
Qualcomm? What practical difference is there between an unenforceability order as to the entire
world and as to a standard with respect to which the patent is essential? But even with the Federal
Circuit’s narrowing of the district court’s unenforceability order, patent unenforceabilty is a
remarkably strong remedy. Was this remedy justified in this case? Why?
5. Nondisclosure as an Antitrust Violation? After the Federal Circuit’s 2003 ruling in favor
of Rambus in Rambus v. Infineon, the Federal Trade Commission initiated a separate action against
Rambus, arguing that its failure to disclose relevant patents to the JEDEC SDO violated U.S.
antitrust law. In 2006, the FTC ruled against Rambus, finding that it had violated both the Sherman
Act and the FTC Act through its deceptive conduct toward JEDEC. The FTC’s ruling was
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overturned on technical antitrust grounds in 2008 by the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit.13
Nevertheless, it is still generally understood that an SDO participant’s intentional failure to
disclose relevant patents to the SDO in violation of its policies is likely to constitute a violation of
the antitrust laws.
6. Disclosure of Licensing Terms. The disclosure policies at issue in the Rambus and
Broadcom cases discussed above concern the disclosure of patents that are (or may be) essential
to the implementation of technical standards. In addition, at least one SDO14 has adopted a policy
requiring the disclosure not only of patents essential to its standards, but also the most restrictive
licensing terms (i.e., the highest royalty rates) on which the patent holder will license those patents
to others. Surprisingly, such “ex ante” licensing disclosure policies have proven extremely
controversial and have been vehemently opposed by patent holders at other SDOs. Why do you
think that a patent holder would object to disclosing its licensing terms for standards-essential
patents?15
C.

FRAND Royalty Rates

One of the most complex issues arising with respect to FRAND licensing is the royalty level
that complies with a SEP holder’s commitment to grant a license on terms that are “fair and
reasonable”. As noted above, most SDOs offer little guidance regarding the actual FRAND royalty
level. Thus, the determination of FRAND royalty rates is typically left to bilateral negotiations
among SEP holders and manufacturers of standardized products. Not surprisingly, there is
sometimes disagreement whether a royalty rate is compliant with the SEP holder’s FRAND
commitment. In some cases, a SEP holder and a manufacturer may disagree whether the royalty
rate demanded by the SEP holder for such a license is FRAND, and the manufacturer may sue the
SEP holder for breaching its FRAND commitment. In other cases, a SEP holder may sue a
manufacturer for infringing its SEPs, and the manufacturer may raise as an affirmative defense the
SEP holder’s obligation to grant the manufacturer a license on FRAND terms. In both of these
scenarios, one of the central questions is whether the royalty rate that the SEP holder sought to
charge the manufacturer was FRAND.
1. FRAND Royalties in the U.S. and the Georgia-Pacific Framework
Under the U.S. Patent Act, the principal measure of damages for patent infringement is a
“reasonable royalty”. As a result, several courts that have calculated FRAND royalty rates have
looked to traditional methodologies for determining reasonable royalty damages. The calculation
of reasonable royalty damages in the U.S. has generally followed the 15-factor framework
established in 1970 by Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 ( S.D.N.Y.
1970). However, because this framework assumes that the patent holder and the infringer have no
pre-existing relationship, and that the patent holder is not otherwise constrained in its ability to
13

Rambus Incorporated v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

14

VITA, the VMEBus International Trade Association, a small SDO that develops electronics standards
for avionics and defense applications.

15

For a discussion of the controversy surrounding this issue, see Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards
and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 Jurimetrics 163 (2013).
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determine its royalty rate, many of the assumptions underlying the Georgia-Pacific analysis do
not apply in cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs.
In Microsoft v. Motorola, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington
sought to determine both a reasonable royalty and a range of reasonable royalties for Motorola’s
patents covering two industry standards. In doing so, the court looked first to the reasonable
royalty damages analysis in Georgia-Pacific, including its hypothetical negotiation framework.
He reasoned that the parties to a hypothetical negotiation would set [F]RAND16 royalty rates by
“looking at the importance of the SEPs to the standard and the importance of the standard and the
SEPs to the products at issue”. However, he also noted that “[f]rom an economic perspective, a
RAND commitment should be interpreted to limit a patent holder to a reasonable royalty on the
economic value of its patented technology itself, apart from the value associated with incorporation
of the patented technology into the standard”.
Ultimately, the court adopted a modified version of the Georgia-Pacific framework in which
it altered twelve of the fifteen factors to take Motorola’s RAND commitment into account. After
establishing this analytical framework, the court looked to several “comparable” sets of license
agreements, including some patent pools, to evaluate the basis for Motorola’s RAND royalty rates.
The RAND royalty rates determined by the court in Microsoft were significantly lower than
the rates originally demanded by Motorola. For example, with respect to SEPs covering the H.264
audio-video encoding standard, Motorola initially demanded a royalty of 2.25% of the end price
of Microsoft products embodying the standard. Thus, for a low-end $500 computer, the per-unit
royalty would have been $11.25. The court, in assessing the value of Motorola’s patents to the
H.264 standard and the value of the standard to the overall products in which it was embodied,
determined a FRAND royalty rate of $0.00555 per unit. Based on these results, Motorola’s initial
royalty demand to Microsoft was more than 2,000 times higher than the “reasonable” royalty rate
determined by the court.

The dispute in Microsoft v. Motorola concerned the
royalty rate for patents covering the Wi-Fi and
H.264 standards used in the Microsoft X-box and
other products

In Innovatio IP Ventures, 956 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D.Ill. 2013), Innovatio, a patent assertion
entity (PAE) holding twenty-three SEPs covering the 802.11 Wi-Fi standards sent demand letters
16

Most courts and commentators who have considered the issue use the terms FRAND and RAND
interchangeably.
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to hundreds of coffee shops, motels, supermarkets and other retail establishments that offered
public Wi-Fi access (thereby allegedly infringing the SEPs), in each case seeking a modest
monetary settlement. The case was consolidated and the court considered Innovatio’s proposed
royalty of 6% of the end price of products such as wireless access points, laptops, tablets and bar
code scanners, resulting in potential royalties ranging from $3.39 to $36.90 per unit. In assessing
the appropriate RAND royalty rate, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois largely
followed the framework described in Microsoft for the determination of RAND royalties. In
particular, it applied a modified Georgia-Pacific analysis that simulates a hypothetical bilateral
negotiation in the context of RAND obligations. After assessing the value of Innovatio’s SEPs, the
court held that the appropriate FRAND royalty was only $0.0956 per unit, making Innovatio’s
initial royalty proposals between 35 and 386 times higher than the adjudicated FRAND royalty
rate.
In Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the FRAND royalty rate was
determined by a jury. Thus, the Federal Circuit, on appeal, was limited to reviewing the trial court’s
instructions to the jury. In the appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the jury verdict
based, in part, on the district court’s instruction to apply the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors without
modification. The Federal Circuit affirmed that, “[i]n a case involving RAND-encumbered patents,
many of the Georgia-Pacific factors simply are not relevant; many are even contrary to RAND
principles”. The Federal Circuit noted several respects in which the Georgia-Pacific factors were
both irrelevant and contrary to the RAND commitment under consideration. Thus, like the court
in Microsoft, the Federal Circuit criticized the use of several specific Georgia-Pacific factors when
considering royalties subject to RAND commitments.
The Federal Circuit in Ericsson v. D-Link made several other important rulings. In particular,
it held that an accused infringer seeking to raise the issue of hold-up to a jury must introduce actual
evidence of the SEP holder’s hold-up behavior. Because this evidence was not introduced by the
alleged infringer, the court was justified in not instructing the jury on the question of hold-up. The
court used similar reasoning with respect to the question of royalty stacking and held that actual
evidence of stacking must be introduced in order for the question to be considered by the jury.
2. Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Royalty Determinations
In most of the cases discussed in Part A above, the courts determined FRAND royalties in a
“bottom-up” manner. That is, they calculated the royalty due to the patent holder based primarily
on the alleged value of the patents in suit, without regard to the overall number or value of patents
covering the standard in question or the results reached by other courts addressing the same
standards. In fact, as the Federal Circuit emphasized in Ericsson v. D-Link, a court may not even
instruct the jury regarding royalty stacking without actual evidence of stacking. When such
bottom-up approaches are used, royalties due to individual patent holders are determined in an
uncoordinated manner independently of one another, and the total royalty burden associated with
a standard emerges only as the sum of its individual components. The problem with such bottomup approaches is that courts may use different royalty criteria and factors case by case, even when
patents covering the same features of the same standard are involved, thus yielding inconsistent
and potentially excessive results. For example, as shown in Table 1, in 2013 and 2014, five
different U.S. district courts calculated royalties for a total of 35 SEPs covering IEEE’s Wi-Fi
standards using different methodologies, with widely divergent results.

22
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3669316

Contreras

IP Licensing and Transactions

Chapter 20

TABLE 1

U.S. Litigated FRAND Royalty Determinations for 802.11 (Wi-Fi) Standard-Essential Patents17

Case
Microsoft v. Motorola
In re Innovatio
Ericsson v. D-Link
Realtek v. LSI
CSIRO v. Cisco

Court (year)
W.D. Wash. (2013)
N.D. Ill. (2013)
E.D. Tex. (2013)
N.D. Cal. (2014)
E.D. Tex. (2014)

Royalty
$0.035 per unit
$0.0956 per unit
$0.15 per unit
0.12% of net sales
Up to $1.90 per unit

The aggregate royalty for these 35 SEPs amounted to approximately 4.5% of the total sale
price of a typical $50 Wi-Fi router. Yet it has been estimated that there are approximately 3,000
patents covering the Wi-Fi standard. If the royalty for each of these patents were calculated in a
similarly uncoordinated, bottom-up manner, the aggregate patent royalty on a Wi-Fi router could
easily surpass the product’s total selling price by at least an order of magnitude. And even if, as
suggested by some commentators, this effect might be reduced because many of these SEPs are
held by the same large firms, the total number of firms holding SEPs covering Wi-Fi is still
significantly larger than the number of adjudicated cases to date.
Given the growing recognition of these issues, commentators, courts and policy makers have
become increasingly attracted to mechanisms that take into account the aggregate royalty burden
associated with a standard when considering the royalties owed to any particular patent holder.
Thus, as noted by the European Commission in a recent communication regarding SEPs, “an
individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation. Parties need to take into account a reasonable
aggregate rate for the standard, assessing the overall added value of the technology.” Royalty
calculation methodologies that seek to address these issues can broadly be termed “top-down”
approaches because they look first to the overall level of royalties associated with a standard and
then allocate a portion of this total to individual patent holders. Top-down approaches implicitly
recognize that when multiple patents cover a single standard, the rate charged by one SEP holder
will necessarily affect the rates that the other SEP holders are able to obtain from a given
manufacturer. Of course, the biggest challenge of a top-down approach is determining the overall
royalty rate for the patents covering a particular standard.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Top Down v. Bottom Up. What are the relative advantages and drawbacks of top-down
and bottom-up approaches to calculating FRAND royalties? Do these advantages and drawbacks
apply to patents other than SEPs?
2. Vive la différence? Are there advantages or disadvantages to the multiple methods of
calculating FRAND royalties recognized by the courts? How might different judicial approaches

17

Jason R. Bartlett and Jorge L. Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader Save the
Internet of Things, 36 REVIEW OF LITIGATION 285, 288 (2017) (citations omitted).
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to FRAND royalty calculation influence licensing negotiations among SEP holders and
manufacturers of standardized products?
3. Third Party Beneficiaries. In general, a FRAND commitment is made by a SEP holder as
part of its agreement to participate in an SDO, whether through a written membership agreement,
the SDO’s corporate bylaws, or a formal policy adopted by the SDO’s board or membership. In
all of these cases, the SEP holder’s formal commitment runs to the SDO rather than to third party
manufacturers of standardized products. Yet it is precisely those manufacturers who will benefit
most directly from the SEP holder’s commitment: they are the ones to which the SEP holder must
grant licenses on FRAND terms. More importantly, it is they, rather than the SDOs themselves,
who are far more likely to seek to enforce a SEP holder’s FRAND commitment in court. Do you
understand why this is the case?
As a result of this mismatch, manufacturers seeking to enforce FRAND commitments against
SEP holders have often sought to do so as intended third party beneficiaries of the SEP holders’
FRAND commitments. As described in Section 301 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and … the
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit
of the promised performance.
What challenges might a product manufacturer face in seeking to enforce a SEP holder’s
FRAND commitment as a third party beneficiary?18 What if some countries do not recognize a
third party beneficiary doctrine in their contract law?19

18

See Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 7, at 508-14.

19

According to Professor Thomas Cotter, courts outside the United States have not found contract theory
to be a particularly strong theory of enforcing FRAND commitments (especially with regard to third-party
beneficiary status). See Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents
and FRAND Royalties, 22 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 311 (2014) (discussing cases from Germany, the
Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea).
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4. Royalty-Free Standards. Not all SEPs are licensed on FRAND terms. In fact, SEPs
covering broadly adopted standards such as USB, Bluetooth, HTML, HTTP, the Worldwide Web
and the Internet Protocol are all made available on a royalty-free basis. Why would the SDOs
behind these standards, and its members, choose this approach? Is this corporate philanthropy, or
are there commercial reasons to release a standard on a royalty-free basis? And if it works for
them, why aren’t all SEPs licensed on a royalty-free basis?20
5. Disclosure versus Licensing Commitments. Not all SDOs require their participants to
license SEPs, whether on FRAND or any other terms. The principal example of such an SDO is
IETF, which requires its participants to disclose any of their patents or patent applications that may
cover an IETF standard that they have helped to develop, but does not require them to license those
patents to anyone. Is this a major oversight, or can you think of a reason that IETF may have
adopted this approach?21 Despite IETF’s lack of a patent licensing commitment, most IETF
participants voluntarily commit to license their patents to implementers of IETF standards on a
royalty-free basis. What might motivate companies to do this?
D.

Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments

The terms offered under a FRAND license must be not only fair and reasonable, but “nondiscriminatory”. Like “fair” and “reasonable”, there is significant debate concerning the meaning
and contours of the obligation to grant licenses on terms that are “non-discriminatory”.
There is a general consensus that in order to comply with the non-discrimination prong of the
FRAND commitment, a SEP holder must treat “similarly situated” licensees in a similar manner.
Several commentators have understood this constraint to allow a SEP holder to charge different
20

For a discussion of this issue and its manifestation in two related but very different industries – wireless
telecommunications and the Internet, see Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standards and
the Internet, 93 Denver L. Rev. 855 (2016).

21

See id.
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royalty rates to implementers based on their size or market share (often with the understanding
that larger players are likely to sell more licensed products and thus pay higher levels of royalties).
In Unwired Planet v. Huawei, the UK High Court for Patents reasons that a FRAND royalty rate
should be set based on the value of the licensed patents, not on the size of other characteristics of
the licensee. Thus, “all licensees who need the same kind of licence will be charged the same kind
of rate” and “[s]mall new entrants are entitled to pay a royalty based on the same benchmark as
established large entities”.
1. Hard-Edged Non-Discrimination
In Unwired Planet, the UK court asks what happens if, after a FRAND rate is agreed between
a SEP holder and an implementer, the implementer discovers that the SEP holder has, previously
or subsequently, granted more favorable terms (i.e., a lower royalty rate) to another “similarly
situated” implementer? Has the SEP holder violated its nondiscrimination commitment?
Interestingly, the court rules that a SEP licensee cannot challenge a license granted to it on FRAND
terms if it later discovers that a similarly-situated licensee is paying a lower rate for the same
patents unless the difference would “distort competition” between the two licensees. In reaching
this conclusion, the court rejects the notion that the ND prong of FRAND implies a “hard-edged”
obligation that places an absolute ceiling on the rate that a SEP holder may charge to other
licensees. That is, some level of “discrimination” might be permitted, so long as the discrepancy
between rates does not distort competition.
2. Level Discrimination
One of the most hotly debated issues concerning the ND prong of FRAND is whether a
FRAND commitment requires a SEP holder to grant a license to all applicants, or whether the SEP
holder may refuse to license certain categories of potential licensees (usually “upstream”
component vendors) so that they may instead license other categories of licensees (usually
“downstream” product vendors that purchase components from upstream vendors). This approach
is largely motivated by the doctrine of patent exhaustion (see Chapter 23), under which a patent
holder may collect a royalty only once per patented article. Thus, if a standardized technology is
implemented in a chip, the SEP holder may collect a royalty either from the manufacturer of the
chip, the assembler of the circuit board on which the chip resides, the producer of the smartphone
in which the board is installed or the user of the smart phone that utilizes the chip. But it cannot
collect royalties from more than one of these parties in the supply chain. The SEP is “exhausted”
once a product is sold by an authorized licensee, and the SEP holder cannot collect royalties from
further downstream users of the patented technology.
There is thus a significant debate regarding the ability of SEP holders, under their FRAND
commitments, to refuse to grant licenses to upstream component manufacturers who seek SEP
licenses. Courts and commentators are divided on this issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held in Microsoft v. Motorola that a SEP holder, in its declarations to the ITU,
promised to “grant a license to an unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide, nondiscriminatory basis”. Likewise, the district court in FTC v. Qualcomm, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
190051, *11-12 (N.D. Cal. 2018), found that the policies of two SDOs, the Telecommunications
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Industry Association (TIA) and the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS),
required Qualcomm to grant licenses to “all applicants”.22
Nevertheless, some have argued that the “non-discrimination” prong of FRAND does not
require SEP holders to offer licenses to every applicant, but only to avoid discrimination within
the class of applicants that the SEP holder chooses to license. SEP holders who refuse to license
component vendors have argued that by instead licensing such component vendors’ downstream
customers, they have, in effect, “indirectly licensed” the component vendors, and that refusing to
license component vendors does not discriminate against competitors. In other words, so long as
no component vendors receive licenses, no one component maker is placed at a competitive
disadvantage compared to the others. This approach was seemingly validated by the district court
in Ericsson v. D-Link, which held that Ericsson did not violate its non-discrimination covenant by
offering licenses only to vendors of “fully compliant” products and refusing to license chip and
component vendors.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. U.S. versus UK. As with so many things (chips v. fries, hood v. bonnet, football v. soccer),
the British and American approaches to non-discrimination in FRAND licenses seem to be at odds
with one another. Does this trans-Atlantic divergence matter? Why?23
2. Making Policies Clear. The reader should by now have realized that if SDO policies were
more explicit about their requirements, disagreements like the ones described in this section would
be less likely to occur. As the National Academies of Science observed:
Ideally, SSO policies should clarify the nature of rights and obligations transferred with an
SEP in a manner that promotes widespread implementation of standards without creating
additional transaction costs that could impede the otherwise efficient transfer of patent rights.
To achieve that balance, SSOs need to consider both the legal implications of their IPR
policies and their practical effects on different stakeholders.24
Some SDOs have sought to clarify their IP policies. For example, in 2015 the IEEE amended
its IP policy to describe various expectations associated with its FRAND commitment, including
an express obligation to grant SEP licenses to all applicants. Why don’t more SDOs clarify their
policies to avoid disagreement over their meaning and intent? What vested interests do you think
might work against clarity of SDO policies? The IEEE’s 2015 policy amendments were met with
fierce opposition. Who do you think opposed them and why?

22

This ruling was later vacated by the Ninth Circuit as moot. FTC v. Qualcomm, slip op. at *20 (9th Cir.,
Aug. 11, 2020).

23

For a discussion of the implications of divergent national approaches to global FRAND licenses, see
Jorge L. Contreras, The New Extraterritoriality: FRAND Royalties, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Global
Race to the Bottom in Disputes over Standards-Essential Patents, 25(2) B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 251 (2019).

24

Natl. Research Council, Intellectual Property Challenges For Standard-Setting In the Global Economy
83 (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill, eds., Natl. Acad. Press 2013).
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3. The Origin of Patent Access Requirements. Commitments to license patents on FRAND
terms have their origin in a series of antitrust remedial orders extending back to the early 1940s.
These orders were put in place to remedy a range of anticompetitive arrangements that patent
holders had created using their patents. More than one hundred such orders were entered by the
1970s.25 Today’s FRAND obligations are different, as they are voluntary commitments made by
participants in SDOs. If the commitment is the same, does it matter that one is imposed by a court
but the other is made voluntarily? Should these commitments be interpreted in a similar manner,
or does the voluntary nature of today’s FRAND commitments make them so unlike their
mandatory predecessors that comparison is unwarranted?
E.

Effect of a FRAND Commitment on Injunctive Relief

One of the remedies available to a patent holder when its patent is infringed is an injunction –
a court order that prohibits the infringer from continuing to infringe the patent. Often, the entry of
an injunction means that the infringer may no longer manufacturer or sell the infringing product,
or that it must design around the patent so that the product no longer infringes. But what happens
when a product implements a widely-adopted industry standard and infringes a SEP that the SEP
holder has committed to license on FRAND terms? May the patent holder seek or obtain an
injunction blocking the manufacturer from making and selling the standardized product?
The analysis of injunctive relief in U.S. patent cases takes its current form from the landmark
U.S. Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). In eBay
the Court held that the decision to grant or deny an injunction is an act of judicial discretion that
must be exercised in accordance with “well-established principles of equity”. The Court articulated
a four-factor equitable test to be applied by courts considering the grant of injunctive relief. This
test requires the plaintiff seeking an injunction to demonstrate:
1.

that it has suffered an irreparable injury;

2.

that remedies available at law [i.e., monetary damages] are inadequate to
compensate it for that injury;

3.

that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and

4.

that the public interest would not be disserved by the award of an injunction.

In view of these factors, some have argued that a SEP holder, by making a FRAND
commitment, implicitly concedes that remedies available at law (i.e., monetary damages) must be
adequate to compensate it for the infringement. They reason that, by committing to grant everyone
a license on FRAND terms, the SEP holder has agreed not to exclude others from the market, but
only to collect only a “reasonable” royalty to compensate it for the infringement of its SEPs. As a
result, they argue that the second eBay factor can never be satisfied by a patent holder that has
made a FRAND commitment, and therefore such a SEP holder should generally be precluded from
seeking injunctive relief to prevent others from operating under its SEPs. The interplay of FRAND

25

See Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard-Setting and
Antitrust through a Historical Lens, 80 Antitrust L.J. 39 (2015).
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commitments with the U.S. law of patent injunctions has given rise to several judicial decisions as
well as guidance from regulatory and enforcement agencies in the U.S.
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Motorola sought an injunction to prevent Microsoft’s
continued infringement of Motorola’s patents covering two industry standards (IEEE’s 802.11 and
ITU’s H.264) as to which Motorola made FRAND commitments. The court evaluated Motorola’s
request for an injunction in view of the four eBay factors and determined that Motorola did not
suffer an irreparable injury or show that monetary damages would be inadequate to compensate it
for the infringement. Accordingly, the court denied Motorola’s request for an injunction.
In Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California held that a SEP holder breached its FRAND commitment by seeking injunctive relief
against an implementer of a standard before the patent holder offered a license to the implementer.
Again, the injunction was denied.
These district court decisions laid the groundwork for the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to consider the issue of injunctive relief in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., in which the district
judge (Richard Posner, sitting by designation from the Seventh Circuit) denied Motorola’s request
for an injunction against Apple’s sale of products that allegedly infringed a SEP covering part of
the UMTS 3G wireless telecommunications standard published by the European
Telecommunications Standards Association (ETSI). The fractured, 3-way opinion of the Federal
Circuit is excerpted below.
APPLE, INC. V. MOTOROLA, INC.
757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
REYNA, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Apple moved for summary judgment that Motorola was not entitled to an injunction for
infringement of the ’898 patent. The ’898 patent is a SEP and, thus, Motorola has agreed to license
it on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing (″FRAND″) terms. The district court
granted Apple’s motion, stating:
I don’t see how, given FRAND, I would be justified in enjoining Apple from
infringing the ’898 unless Apple refuses to pay a royalty that meets the FRAND
requirement. By committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola
committed to license the ’898 to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus
implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to
use that patent. How could it do otherwise? How could it be permitted to enjoin
Apple from using an invention that it contends Apple must use if it wants to make
a cell phone with UMTS telecommunications capability—without which it would
not be a cell phone.
To the extent that the district court applied a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for
SEPs, it erred.
While Motorola’s FRAND commitments are certainly criteria relevant to its entitlement to an
injunction, we see no reason to create, as some amici urge, a separate rule or analytical framework
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for addressing injunctions for FRAND-committed patents. The framework laid out by the Supreme
Court in eBay, as interpreted by subsequent decisions of this court, provides ample strength and
flexibility for addressing the unique aspects of FRAND committed patents and industry standards
in general. A patentee subject to FRAND commitments may have difficulty establishing
irreparable harm. On the other hand, an injunction may be justified where an infringer unilaterally
refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect. To be clear, this
does not mean that an alleged infringer’s refusal to accept any license offer necessarily justifies
issuing an injunction. For example, the license offered may not be on FRAND terms. In addition,
the public has an interest in encouraging participation in standard-setting organizations but also in
ensuring that SEPs are not overvalued. While these are important concerns, the district courts are
more than capable of considering these factual issues when deciding whether to issue an injunction
under the principles in eBay.
Applying those principles here, we agree with the district court that Motorola is not entitled to
an injunction for infringement of the ’898 patent. Motorola’s FRAND commitments, which have
yielded many license agreements encompassing the ’898 patent, strongly suggest that money
damages are adequate to fully compensate Motorola for any infringement. Similarly, Motorola has
not demonstrated that Apple’s infringement has caused it irreparable harm. Considering the large
number of industry participants that are already using the system claimed in the ’898 patent,
including competitors, Motorola has not provided any evidence that adding one more user would
create such harm. Again, Motorola has agreed to add as many market participants as are willing to
pay a FRAND royalty. Motorola argues that Apple has refused to accept its initial licensing offer
and stalled negotiations. However, the record reflects that negotiations have been ongoing, and
there is no evidence that Apple has been, for example, unilaterally refusing to agree to a deal.
Consequently, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment that Motorola is not
entitled to an injunction for infringement of the ’898 patent.
RADER, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTING-IN-PART.
I join the court’s opinion in its entirety, except for the affirmance of the district court’s denial
of Motorola’s request for an injunction. To my eyes, the record contains sufficient evidence to
create a genuine dispute of material fact on Apple’s posture as an unwilling licensee whose
continued infringement of the ’898 patent caused irreparable harm. Because of the unique and
intensely factual circumstances surrounding patents adopted as industry standards, I believe the
district court improperly granted summary judgment. Therefore, on this narrow point, I
respectfully dissent in part.
At the outset, a patent adopted as a standard undoubtedly gains value by virtue of that adoption.
This enhancement complicates the evaluation of the technology independent of the
standardization. By the same token, the standardization decision may also simply reflect and
validate the inherent value of the technology advance accomplished by the patent. Untangling
these value components (at the heart of deciding whether a putative licensee was ″unwilling″ to
license, and thus irreparable harm and other injunction factors) requires intense economic analysis
of complex facts. In sum, right from the theoretical outset, this question is not likely to be
susceptible to summary adjudication.
In reciting the legal principles for an injunction, this court accurately states the inquiries. Those
principles supply no per se rule either favoring or proscribing injunctions for patents in any setting,
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let alone the heightened complexity of standardized technology. This court notes that a patent
owner in a standard context ″may have difficulty establishing irreparable harm … [but] an
injunction may be justified where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or
unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect.″
Market analysts will no doubt observe that a ″hold out″ (i.e., an unwilling licensee of an SEP
seeking to avoid a license based on the value that the technological advance contributed to the
prior art) is equally as likely and disruptive as a ″hold up″ (i.e., an SEP owner demanding
unjustified royalties based solely on value contributed by the standardization). These same
complex factual questions regarding ″hold up″ and ″hold out″ are highly relevant to an injunction
request. In sum, differentiating ″hold up″ from ″hold out″ requires some factual analysis of the
sources of value—the inventive advance or the standardization.
The record in this case shows evidence that Apple may have been a hold out. This evidence
alone would create a dispute of material fact.
More important, the district court made no effort to differentiate the value due to inventive
contribution from the value due to standardization. Without some attention to that perhaps
dispositive question, the trial court was adrift without a map, let alone a compass or GPS system.
In fact, without that critical inquiry, the district court could not have properly applied the eBay test
as it should have.
Instead of a proper injunction analysis, the district court effectively considered Motorola’s
FRAND commitment as dispositive by itself: ″Motorola committed to license the ’898 to anyone
willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate
compensation for a license to use that patent. How could it do otherwise?″ To the contrary,
Motorola committed to offer a FRAND license, which begs the question: What is a ″fair″ and
″reasonable″ royalty? If Motorola was offering a fair and reasonable royalty, then Apple was likely
″refus[ing] a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delay[ing] negotiations.” In sum, the district court
could not duck the question that it did not address; was Motorola’s FRAND offer actually
FRAND?
Furthermore, the district court acknowledged the conflicting evidence about Apple’s
willingness to license the ’898 patent: ″Apple’s refusal to negotiate for a license (if it did refuse—
the parties offer competing accounts, unnecessary for me to resolve, of why negotiations broke
down) was not a defense to a claim by Motorola for a FRAND royalty.″ Yet this scenario,
adequately presented by this record, is precisely one that the court today acknowledges may justify
an injunction.
In my opinion, the court should have allowed Motorola to prove that Apple was an unwilling
licensee, which would strongly support its injunction request. The court states that ″the record
reflects that negotiations have been ongoing,″ but, as the district court even acknowledged,
Motorola asserts otherwise—that Apple for years refused to negotiate while nevertheless
infringing the ’898 patent. Motorola should have had the opportunity to prove its case that Apple’s
alleged unwillingness to license or even negotiate supports a showing that money damages are
inadequate and that it suffered irreparable harm. The district court refused to develop the facts
necessary to apply eBay as it should have. Consequently, the case should be remanded to develop
that record. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part.
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PROST, CIRCUIT JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART.
I concur in the majority’s judgment that Motorola is not entitled to an injunction for
infringement of the ’898 patent. However, I write separately to note my disagreement with the
majority’s suggestion that an alleged infringer’s refusal to negotiate a license justifies the issuance
of an injunction after a finding of infringement.
As an initial matter, I agree with the majority that there is no need to create a categorical rule
that a patentee can never obtain an injunction on a FRAND-committed patent. Rather, FRAND
commitment should simply be factored into the consideration of the eBay framework. Moreover,
I agree that a straightforward application of the eBay factors does not necessarily mean that
injunctive relief would never be available for a FRAND-committed patent. However, I disagree as
to the circumstances under which an injunction might be appropriate.
Motorola argues—and the majority agrees—that an injunction might be appropriate where an
alleged infringer ″unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the
same effect.″ Motorola insists that in the absence of the threat of an injunction, an infringer would
have no incentive to negotiate a license because the worst-case scenario from a patent infringement
lawsuit is that it would have to pay the same amount it would have paid earlier for a license.
I disagree that an alleged infringer’s refusal to enter into a licensing agreement justifies
entering an injunction against its conduct, for several reasons. First, as Apple points out, an alleged
infringer is fully entitled to challenge the validity of a FRAND-committed patent before agreeing
to pay a license on that patent, and so should not necessarily be punished for less than eager
negotiations. Second, there are many reasons an alleged infringer might prefer to pay a FRAND
license rather than undergoing extensive litigation, including litigation expenses, the possibility of
paying treble damages or attorney’s fees if they are found liable for willful infringement, and the
risk that the fact-finder may award damages in an amount higher than the FRAND rates. Indeed,
as Motorola itself pointed out, we have previously acknowledged that a trial court may award an
amount of damages greater than a reasonable royalty if necessary ″to compensate for the
infringement.″ Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Thus, if a trial court
believes that an infringer previously engaged in bad faith negotiations, it is entitled to increase the
damages to account for any harm to the patentee as a result of that behavior.
But regardless, none of these considerations alters the fact that monetary damages are likely
adequate to compensate for a FRAND patentee’s injuries. I see no reason, therefore, why a party’s
pre-litigation conduct in license negotiations should affect the availability of injunctive relief.
Instead, an injunction might be appropriate where, although monetary damages could
compensate for the patentee’s injuries, the patentee is unable to collect the damages to which it is
entitled. For example, if an alleged infringer were judgment-proof, a damages award would likely
be an inadequate remedy. Or, if a defendant refused to pay a court-ordered damages award after
being found to infringe a valid FRAND patent, a court might be justified in including an injunction
as part of an award of sanctions.
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But regardless, these circumstances are not present in this case, and I agree with the district
court that under the facts here, Motorola cannot show either irreparable harm or inadequacy of
damages. I would therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Motorola’s claim for injunctive
relief for the ’898 patent.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Three Judges, Three Opinions. What is the crux of the Federal Circuit panelists’
disagreement in Apple v. Motorola? Which of the judges do you most agree with?.
2. Holdout. In the plurality opinion in Apple v. Motorola, Judge Reyna comments that “an
injunction may be justified where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or
unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect.” This type of bad faith behavior by potential
licensees is often referred to as “holdout” or “reverse holdup”. Chief Judge Rader argues that
holdout “is equally as likely and disruptive as a ″hold up″”. Do you agree? Are hold-up and
holdout just two sides of the same coin, or different types of wrongs?
3. Enhanced Damages for FRAND Violations? In her concurring opinion in Apple v.
Motorola, Judge Prost makes that point that a SEP holder that is denied injunctive relief may not
be entirely out of luck, as courts have the discretion to increase the damages awarded if the
infringer engaged in bad faith negotiations. Is the likelihood of an enhanced damages award higher
with respect to SEPs than other patents? Why?26
4. The FTC and Injunctive Relief. The Federal Trade Commission has also determined that a
SEP holder subject to a FRAND commitment should be limited in its ability to seek injunctive
relief from a potential SEP licensee. In late 2012 and 2013, the FTC brought actions under Section
5 of the FTC Act against Robert Bosch GmbH and Motorola Mobility (since acquired by Google)
to address threats of injunctive relief against potential SEP licensees. The FTC’s claims were
settled by consent decrees in which the SEP holders agreed not to seek injunctive relief against
infringers of FRAND-committed patents unless the infringer was beyond the jurisdiction of the
U.S. courts, stated in writing that it would not accept a license of the patent, refused to enter into
a license agreement determined by a court or arbitrator to comply with the FRAND requirement,
or failed to provide written confirmation of an offer of a FRAND license. How do these exceptions
square with the opinions in Apple v. Motorola?
5. The European Approach: Huawei v. ZTE. Under the national laws of some European
countries, Germany in particular, injunctions are issued automatically once a patent holder
establishes that its patent has been infringed, and prior to any adjudication of the validity of the
asserted patent. This strong presumption in favor of injunctions is somewhat offset by the effect
of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits
the “abuse of a dominant position”. In some cases, dominance may be conferred by patent rights,
and SEPs in particular. Thus, it is possible that a SEP holder’s attempt to obtain an injunction
against the manufacturer of a standardized product could constitute a violation of Article 102.

26

For a discussion of this issue, see Jorge L. Contreras, et al., The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent
Remedies, in Patent Remedies and Complex Products: Toward a Global Consensus, Ch. 5 (C. Bradford
Biddle et al, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press: 2019, forthcoming).
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The analytical framework for assessing abuse of dominance with SEPs subject to FRAND
commitments was established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Huawei v. ZTE. In
Huawei, the ECJ held that if a SEP holder possesses market dominance, then in order to avoid
violating Article 102, the SEP holder must comply with a series of procedural steps. Likewise, in
order to preserve its ability to challenge the SEP holder’s conduct under Article 102, the infringer
must comply with a similar series of procedural steps. The combination of these behavioral
requirements has been referred to as the Huawei “choreography”. The required steps in this
choreography are summarized below:
1.

The patentee must notify the defendant of the alleged infringement;

2.

defendant must show its willingness to license on FRAND terms;

3.

patentee must make a specific, written offer for a license on FRAND terms;

4.

defendant must diligently respond to that offer without delaying tactics;

5.

If defendant rejects the patentee’s offer, it must make a counter-offer on
FRAND terms; and

6.
If patentee rejects the counter-offer, the defendant must provide appropriate
security (including for past use) and be able to render an account of its acts of use.
In the few years since the Huawei decision, a number of cases in Germany and other
jurisdictions have helped to clarify these requirements, though they seem to raise as many
questions as they answer.27
6. Waiver. Given the legal uncertainty surrounding the availability of injunctive relief,
particularly on an international basis, some SDOs have sought to address the issue in their IP
policies. While an SDO’s internal policies do not affect underlying legal rules, they can impose
contractual restraints on its members’ behavior and establish presumptions that can be considered
by courts when assessing a request for injunctive relief. Below is an example of a contractual
waiver of injunctive relief included in IEEE’s patent policy (note that in IEEE, SEP holders make
licensing commitments under written Letters of Assurance or LOAs):

27

For a good summary of Huawei and subsequent cases, see Robin Jacob & Alexander Milner, Lessons
from Huawei v. ZTE, 4iP Council research report, Oct. 2016, http://www.4ipcouncil.com/news/latestresearch-4ip-council-lessons-huawei-v-zte.
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IEEE STANDARDS ASSOCIATION
IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws (Dec. 2017)
“Prohibitive Order” shall mean an interim or permanent injunction, exclusion order, or similar
adjudicative directive that limits or prevents making, having made, using, selling, offering to sell,
or importing a Compliant Implementation.
An Accepted LOA … signifies that reasonable terms and conditions, including without
compensation or under Reasonable Rates, are sufficient compensation for a license to use those
Essential Patent Claims and precludes seeking, or seeking to enforce, a Prohibitive Order except
as provided in this policy.
The Submitter of an Accepted LOA who has committed to make available a license for one or
more Essential Patent Claims agrees that it shall neither seek nor seek to enforce a Prohibitive
Order based on such Essential Patent Claim(s) in a jurisdiction unless the implementer fails to
participate in, or to comply with the outcome of, an adjudication, including an affirming first-level
appellate review, if sought by any party within applicable deadlines, in that jurisdiction by one or
more courts that have the authority to: determine Reasonable Rates and other reasonable terms and
conditions; adjudicate patent validity, enforceability, essentiality, and infringement; award
monetary damages; and resolve any defenses and counterclaims. In jurisdictions where the failure
to request a Prohibitive Order in a pleading waives the right to seek a Prohibitive Order at a later
time, a Submitter may conditionally plead the right to seek a Prohibitive Order to preserve its right
to do so later, if and when this policy’s conditions for seeking, or seeking to enforce, a Prohibitive
Order are met.

What is prohibited by the above policy clause? Under what circumstances is a SEP holder
permitted to seek a Prohibitive Order against the implementer of an IEEE standard? What is the
purpose of the final sentence of this policy language?
As noted above, the IEEE policy has been controversial. Who might have opposed the adoption
of the clause shown above? On what basis? Do you think that the clause will have a positive or
negative effect on standards-development at IEEE? Why?
F.

The Transfer of FRAND Commitments

In Chapter 2, we considered issues arising from the assignment and transfer of intellectual
property rights. In Chapter 11, we addressed the assignment and transfer of IP license rights.
FRAND commitments raise a new set of issues: when a patent as to which a FRAND commitment
has been made is transferred, what happens to that commitment?28 Does the commitment only

28

This question is separate from the fate of licenses that have been executed in response to a FRAND
commitment. Those licenses, as discussed in Chapter 11, likely continue following the transfer of the
underlying patents. FRAND commitments, however, are commitments to enter into licenses, rather than
licenses themselves.
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bind the firm that made the commitment, or does the commitment travel with the patent to bind its
new owner? Absent specific language in the relevant SDO policy, the answer is less than clear.
This issue first received broad attention in connection with a patent covering part of IEEE’s
802.3 Fast Ethernet standard. In 1994, the patent’s original owner, National Semiconductor,
committed to IEEE that it would license the patent for a flat fee of $1,000 to any party
implementing the standard. National Semiconductor later sold the patent, which was eventually
acquired by Negotiated Data Solutions (N-Data), a PAE run by a former National Semiconductor
attorney. N-Data announced that while it would license the patent on FRAND terms, it did not
intend to honor National Semiconductor’s original $1,000 licensing offer. The FTC brought an
action claiming that N-Data’s disavowal of National Semiconductor’s commitment constituted an
unfair method of competition, as well as an unfair act or practice, in violation of Section 5 of the
FTC Act (see Chapter 25). The case was settled with a consent decree pursuant to which N-Data
agreed to honor National Semiconductor’s original $1,000 licensing commitment.29
The issue of transfers arose again in 2011, when bankrupt Nortel Networks, a contributor to
several SDOs, proposed the sale of its assets, including approximately 4,000 patents, in a
bankruptcy sale on a “free and clear” basis.30 Several product vendors, together with IEEE, argued
that Nortel’s “free and clear” sale could erase the patent licensing commitments that Nortel had
previously made to SDOs including IEEE. Ultimately, the purchaser of the patents, a consortium
including several large product vendors, voluntarily agreed to abide by Nortel’s prior FRAND
commitments and the issue was not adjudicated.31
Because the law remains unsettled in this regard, an increasing number of SDOs require
participants that transfer SEPs as to which FRAND commitments have been made to ensure that
those commitments are binding on subsequent owners of those SEPs. The policy approach adopted
by IETF is shown below.

29

Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246 (F.T.C. Sept. 22, 2008).

30

Under Section 363(f) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession may sell
the bankruptcy estate’s assets “free and clear of any interest in such property.” See Chapter 28 for a further
discussion of bankruptcy issues in IP licensing transactions.

31

In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 469 B.R. 478, 488 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (“On July 11, 2011, the Court
entered an order approving the sale of Nortel’s Residual Patent Assets, representing some 6,000 patents for
telecommunications, internet, wireless, and other technology, to Rockstar Bidco, LP.”).
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INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE
RFC 8179/BCP 79 - Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology (May 2017)
5.5.c. It is likely that IETF will rely on licensing declarations and other information that may be
contained in an IPR disclosure and that implementers will make technical, legal, and commercial
decisions on the basis of such commitments and information. Thus, when licensing declarations
and other information, comments, notes, or URLs for further information are contained in an IPR
disclosure, the persons making such disclosure agree and acknowledge that the commitments
and information contained in such disclosure shall be irrevocable and will attach, to the extent
permissible by law, to the associated IPR, and all implementers of Implementing Technologies
will be justified and entitled to rely on such materials in relating to such IPR, whether or not such
IPR is subsequently transferred to a third party by the IPR holder making the commitment or
providing the information. IPR holders making IPR disclosures that contain licensing declarations
or providing such information, comments, notes, or URLs for further information must ensure that
such commitments are binding on any transferee of the relevant IPR, and that such transferee will
use reasonable efforts to ensure that such commitments are binding on a subsequent transferee of
the relevant IPR, and so on.

NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. A Non-Contested Policy. Unlike SDO policy amendments seeking to clarify the method of
calculating FRAND royalties or limiting the ability of SDO members to seek injunctive relief,
policy language requiring SEP licensing commitments to travel with transferred patents has not
been particularly controversial.32 Why not? Are there parties that might not wish FRAND licensing
commitments to continue after a SEP is transferred to a new owner?
2. The View from the Government. As noted above, the FTC brought an action against NData when it disavowed National Semiconductor’s original SEP licensing commitment to IEEE.
In 2012 and 2013, the FTC initiated actions against Motorola Mobility (then owned by Google)
and Robert Bosch for similar reasons.33 Those actions also resulted in consent decrees. Officials
from the DOJ and the European Commission have also encouraged SDOs to clarify that SEP
licensing commitments travel with the underlying patents when they are transferred. Why are
government enforcement agencies so interested in this topic? Why is this issue primarily
addressed by antitrust and competition enforcement agencies rather than the legislature or other
administrative agencies?

32

For a discussion of contested versus non-contested SDO policy amendments, see Justus Baron, et al,
Making the Rules: The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on
Intellectual Property Rights, JRC Science for Policy Report EUR 29655 at 157-58 (Mar. 2019).

33

Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013);
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Robert Bosch GmbH, F.T.C. File No. 121-0081 (F.T.C. Nov.
26, 2012).
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3. FRAND as Servitude? One theory that has been proposed in the literature is that FRAND
commitments relating to SEPs can be analogized to real property servitudes (easements,
covenants) that “run with the land”. Thus, just as when a piece of real estate is sold, easements
across that property continue to bind the new owner, FRAND commitments made with respect to
a patent should continue to bind each successive owner of the patent. What do you think of this
theory? Property-based analogies have not been embraced by courts assessing FRAND
commitments. Why not?34

34

For a discussion and critique of these theories, see Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 7, at 536-38.
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